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Institutions, Resources, and Entry Strategies in Emerging Economies 
 
Abstract 
 
We investigate the impact of market-supporting institutions on business strategies by 
analyzing the entry strategies of foreign investors entering emerging economies. We apply 
and advance the institution-based view of strategy by integrating it with resource-based 
considerations. In particular, we show how resource-seeking strategies are pursued using 
different entry modes in different institutional contexts. Alternative modes of entry—
greenfield, acquisition, and joint venture (JV)—allow firms to overcome different kinds of 
market inefficiencies related to both characteristics of the resources and to the institutional 
context. In a weaker institutional framework, JVs are used to access many resources, but in a 
stronger institutional framework, JVs become less important while acquisitions can play a 
more important role in accessing resources that are intangible and organizationally 
embedded. Combining survey and archival data from four emerging economies, India, 
Vietnam, South Africa, and Egypt, we provide empirical support for our hypotheses.  
 
Running Head: Institutions, Resources, and Entry Strategies  
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What determines foreign market entry strategies? To answer this question, most existing 
literature has focused on the characteristics of the entering firm, in particular its resources and 
capabilities (Barney, 1991; Anand and Delios, 2002) and its need to minimize transaction 
costs (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Hill, Hwang, and Kim, 
1990). While resources and capabilities are certainly important (Peng, 2001), recent work has 
suggested that strategies are moderated by the characteristics of the particular context in 
which firms operate (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Meyer and Peng, 2005; Tsui, 2004; Meyer, 
2006, 2007).  
In particular, institutions—the ‘rules of the game’— in the host economy also 
significantly shape firm strategies such as foreign market entry (Peng, 2003; Wright et al., 
2005). In a broad sense, macro-level institutions affect transaction costs (North, 1990). 
However, traditional transaction cost research (exemplified by Williamson, 1985) has 
focused on micro-analytical aspects such as opportunism and bounded rationality. As a result, 
questions of how macro-level institutions, such as country-level legal and regulatory 
frameworks, influence transaction costs have been relatively unexplored, remaining largely as 
‘background.’  
 However, a new generation of research suggests that institutions are much more than 
background conditions, and that ‘institutions directly determine what arrows a firm has in its 
quiver as it struggles to formulate and implement strategy and to create competitive 
advantage’ (Ingram and Silverman, 2002: 20, added italics). Nowhere is this point more 
clearly borne out than in emerging economies, where institutional frameworks differ greatly 
from those in developed economies (Khanna, Palepu, and Sindha, 2005; Meyer and Peng, 
2005; Wright et al., 2005; Gelbuda, Meyer, and Delios, 2008). Given these institutional 
differences, how do foreign firms adapt entry strategies when entering emerging economies?   
 Focusing on this key question, we argue (1) that institutional development (or 
underdevelopment) in different emerging economies directly affects entry strategies, and (2) 
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that investors’ needs for local resources impact entry strategies in different ways in different 
institutional contexts. In essence, we advocate an integrative perspective calling not only for 
explicit considerations of institutional effects, but also for their integration with resource-
based considerations. This article thus responds to the call issued by Meyer and Peng (2005), 
Peng (2001, 2003, 2009), Wright et al. (2005), and Yamakawa, Peng, and Deeds (2008) for 
more integration between institutional and resource-based views. We achieve this integration 
by focusing on a central concept in both lines of theorizing, namely, the effectiveness of 
markets in facilitating access to sought resources. We thus depart from much of the existing 
entry strategy literature, which either focuses on the institutional side (Brouthers and 
Brouthers, 2000; Meyer, 2001; Hitt et al., 2004) or the resource-based side (Anand and 
Delios, 2002). Specifically, we examine how multinational enterprises (MNEs), when 
entering emerging economies, choose among three modes of entry involving foreign direct 
investment (FDI): (1) greenfield, (2) acquisition, and (3) joint venture (JV).  
We test our hypotheses by integrating unique survey data with archival data from 
Egypt, India, South Africa, and Vietnam (Estrin and Meyer, 2004). These emerging 
economies are selected because they show substantial variation in formal and informal 
institutions. They also represent a cross-section of midsized emerging economies that 
substantially liberalized their economies since the 1990s.  
Overall, this article makes three contributions. First, we enrich an institution-based 
view of business strategy (Oliver, 1997; Peng, 2003; Peng, Wang, and Jiang, 2008) by 
providing a more fine-grained conceptual analysis of the relationship between institutional 
frameworks and entry strategies. Our primary hypotheses suggest that institutional 
development reduces the need for a JV partner and thus facilitates acquisition and greenfield 
entry, while resource needs increase the preference for both acquisition and JV, but not 
greenfield entry. Second, we argue that institutions moderate resource-based considerations 
when crafting entry strategies. More specifically, where the institutional framework is weak, 
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JVs are used to access many resources. However, where institutions are stronger and ensure a 
higher degree of market effectiveness, JVs become less important while acquisitions become 
a more significant tool to access resources that are intangible. Finally, by amassing a primary 
survey database from four diverse but relatively underexplored countries and combining such 
data with archival data, we extend the geographic reach of empirical research on emerging 
economies. Earlier studies of entry in emerging economies have concentrated on Central and 
Eastern Europe (Meyer, 2001; Brouthers and Brouthers, 2003; Meyer and Peng, 2005) and 
China (Tse, Pan, and Au, 1997; Luo and Peng, 1999; Quer, Claver, and Rienda, 2007). Never 
before have foreign entrants in four diverse emerging economies been systematically studied 
via a common research design and survey instrument as we have done in this study.  
 
ENTRY MODE CHOICES 
The modes of establishing an FDI project can be classified into three types: (1) 
greenfield, (2) acquisition, and (3) JV (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Anand and Delios, 2002; 
Elango and Sambharya, 2004). JVs and acquisitions both provide access to resources held by 
local firms, with JVs partially integrating selected local resources from a local partner and 
acquisitions integrating the local firm in toto. A greenfield project does not directly access a 
local firm as a bundle of organizational resources, but allows the entrant to buy or contract 
for resource components available on local markets, such as real estate and labor.  
Theoretically, each of these three modes is distinct and satisfies different objectives. 
However, most research has used frameworks that imply the choices would be sequential and 
bimodal: on the one hand JV versus acquisition/greenfield (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; 
Hennart, 1988, Hill et al., 1990; Tse et al., 1997) and on the other hand acquisition versus 
greenfield (Hennart and Park, 1993; Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; Anand and Delios, 
2002). These models suggest that ownership and entry mode can be viewed as sequential 
decisions, with firms first deciding partial (JV) versus full ownership (acquisition/greenfield) 
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and then, if full ownership is preferred, choosing between acquisition and greenfield. In 
practice, the two stages in such a sequence are often blurred, as indicated by case studies 
(Estrin and Meyer, 2004) and large-sample studies that examine these three entry choices 
simultaneously (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Chang and Rosenzweig, 2001; Elango and 
Sambharya, 2004; Dikova and van Witteloostuijn, 2007). Moreover, the institutional issues 
affect the ownership and entry mode questions simultaneously. Consequently, we analyze the 
three entry choices as being interdependent and consider them simultaneously.  
JVs and acquisitions are used to access resources previously embedded in another 
organization. Yet, why would investors not rather buy the specific resources they need using 
standard market transactions? Acquiring a firm exposes a firm to major challenges in 
managing the purchased business (Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991; Capron, Mitchel, and 
Swaminathan, 2001), and a JV creates substantial coordination challenges (Kogut, 1988; 
Buckley and Casson, 1998). Thus, if the local markets for the necessary resources are 
efficient, foreign entrants may buy the required resources (or their components) using market 
transactions and thus establish a greenfield operation based on these purchased resources (or 
their components). However, efficiency of local markets is not always the norm (Estrin, 
2002). Markets for acquisitions (buying and selling companies) may be especially 
problematic in emerging economies (Peng and Heath, 1996). More generally, markets for 
acquiring local resources may be suboptimal because of the institutional environment 
governing the transaction (North, 1990; Peng, 2006). They may also be suboptimal because 
of the characteristics of the sought resources (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Williamson, 1985). 
We proceed to discuss these two phenomena and their interaction in the following sections.  
 
INSTITUTIONS AND ENTRY STRATEGIES 
Institutions have an essential role in a market economy to support the effective 
functioning of the market mechanism, such that firms and individuals can engage in market 
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transactions without incurring undue costs or risks (North, 1990; Peng, 2009). These 
institutions include, for example, the legal framework and its enforcement, property rights, 
information systems, and regulatory regimes. We consider institutional arrangements to be 
‘strong’ if they support the voluntary exchange underpinning an effective market mechanism. 
Conversely, we refer to institutions as ‘weak’ if they fail to ensure effective markets or even 
undermine markets (as in the case of corrupt business practices). Where institutions are 
strong in developed economies, their role, though critical, may be almost invisible. In 
contrast, when markets malfunction, as in some emerging economies, the absence of market-
supporting institutions is ‘conspicuous’ (MacMillan, 2007). 
Institutional differences are particularly significant for MNEs operating in multiple 
institutional contexts (Globerman and Shapiro, 1999). Formal rules establish the permissible 
range of entry choices (e.g., with respect to equity ownership) but informal rules may also 
affect entry decisions. Thus, legal restrictions may limit the equity stake that foreign investors 
are allowed to hold (Delios and Beamish, 1999) and informal norms, such as norms 
concerning whether bribery is acceptable, may favor locally owned firms over MNEs (Peng, 
2003). In other words, because the transactions costs of engaging in these markets are 
relatively higher, MNEs have to devise strategies to overcome these constraints (Peng, 2009). 
Institutions also provide information about business partners and their likely behavior, 
which reduces information asymmetries—a core source of market failure (Arrow, 1971; 
Casson, 1997). In many emerging economies, weak institutional arrangements may magnify 
information asymmetries so firms face higher partner-related risks (Meyer, 2001) and need to 
spend more resources searching for information (Tong, Reuer, and Peng, 2008).  
  The strengthening of the institutional framework thus lowers costs of doing business 
(Estrin, 2002; Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles, 2003; Bevan, Estrin, and Meyer, 2004) and 
influences foreign entrants’ mode decisions by moderating the costs of alternative organizational 
forms (Williamson, 1985). In consequence, the relative costs associated with different entry 
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modes are affected by the institutional framework (Henisz, 2000; Meyer, 2001).  
  In particular, JVs provide a means to access resources held by local firms, including 
resources such as networks that may help to counteract idiosyncrasies of a weak institutional 
context (Delios and Beamish, 1999). However, the need for a partner may decline with the 
strengthening of the institutional framework (Meyer, 2001; Peng, 2003; Steensma et al., 2005). 
For example, as the regulatory environment in an emerging economy improves, more sectors 
will be opened to FDI and foreign entrants will face fewer formalities, permits, and licenses. 
Hence, a reduction of restrictions on FDI may reduce the need for a local JV partner as an 
interface with local authorities (Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Delios and Beamish, 1999; Peng, 2006). 
Similarly, improved regulatory frameworks may reduce the need to rely on relationships of a 
local JV partner when dealing with local businesses (Oxley, 1998; Meyer, 2001).  
  Entry by acquisition is an entry mode that is particularly sensitive to the efficiency 
of markets, especially financial markets and the market for corporate control (Peng, 2009). 
Transactions in financial markets are greatly facilitated by an institutional framework that 
ensures transparency, predictability, and contract enforcement (Peng and Heath, 1996; Beim 
and Calomiris, 2003). However, institutional arrangements and the efficiency of financial 
markets vary considerably. In developed countries, firms can be taken over via a friendly or 
hostile bid after the acquisition of a substantial proportion of the equity. The restructuring of 
the acquired firm then allows the separation of wanted and unwanted business units (Capron 
et al., 2001), which may also favor foreign entry by acquisition.  
  However, the weakness of institutions in emerging economies can lead to smaller, 
more volatile, and less liquid stock markets, which reduces the potential for acquisitions (Lin 
et al., 2008). In such an environment, firms are typically controlled by a dominant 
stakeholder (individual or family), a business group, or the state (Khanna and Palepu, 2000; 
Kock and Gullen, 2000; Kedia, Mukherjee, and Lahiri, 2006; Young et al., 2008). In 
addition, weak institutions lead to a lack of transparent financial data and other information 
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on firms and a shortage of specialized financial intermediaries (Khanna et al., 2005). Many of 
the resources and organizational structures of local firms are built around nonmarket forms of 
transactions, and are therefore harder for potential acquirers to evaluate (Tong et al., 2008). 
This raises the complexity and transaction costs of undertaking the due diligence and contract 
negotiations necessary for acquisitions and post-acquisition restructuring (Peng, 2006). Thus, 
costs and risks increase when institutional frameworks are weaker.  
  Combining these arguments, we posit that foreign entrants may need access to local 
resources in emerging economies to overcome inefficiencies caused by weak institutions. 
Yet, at the same time, weak institutional frameworks make it more difficult to access these 
resources via market transactions (which inhibit greenfield entry) and raise the costs of 
acquiring local firms (which make acquisitions challenging). In contrast, JVs provide a means 
to access local resources where arm’s-length market transactions are difficult. Therefore:  
H1: The stronger the market-supporting institutions in an emerging economy, the less 
likely foreign entrants are to enter by joint venture (as opposed to greenfield or 
acquisition). 
 
RESOURCES AND ENTRY STRATEGIES 
Entry by acquisitions or JVs takes the form of pooling resources between a foreign 
entrant and a local firm. In contrast, greenfield projects do not provide access to resources 
embedded in local firms. The choice of entry mode thus depends on whether and to what degree 
foreign entrants require such resources. In emerging economies, investing firms usually require 
context-specific resources to achieve competitive advantages (Delios and Beamish, 1999; Meyer 
and Peng, 2005). In contrast, the strategic management literature on entry strategies has 
primarily focused on the characteristics of resources to be transferred (Kogut and Zander 1993) 
and the characteristics of the investing firm (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Hennart and Park, 
1993). This suggests a need to complement this literature by considering the characteristics of 
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these sought resources.  
Context-specific resources come in at least two forms. First, where legal institutions 
such as contract law and enforcement of property rights are weak, firms may also need to rely 
more on network- and relationship-based strategies, thereby developing the ability to enforce 
contracts, which are often informal, using norms as opposed to litigation. Therefore, networks 
and relationships with other firms, with agents in the distribution channels, and with government 
authorities are all important assets in emerging economies (Peng and Heath, 1996). 
 Second, context-specific capabilities, such as strategic and organizational flexibility, 
may enhance competitiveness in the volatile environments of emerging economies (Lane, Salk, 
and Lyles, 2001; Uhlenbruck, Meyer, and Hitt, 2003). Other important capabilities may relate 
to managing large local labor forces, managing interfaces with government authorities, and 
developing capabilities that enable firms to build and maintain networks and relationships 
(Kock and Guillén, 2000; Henisz, 2003; Van de Ven, 2004). Foreign entrants that consider 
local resources to be important for their competitiveness may prefer to establish their operation 
with a local partner as a JV or through acquisition as opposed to greenfield. Thus:  
H2a: The stronger the need to rely on local resources to enhance competitiveness, the less 
likely foreign entrants are to enter an emerging economy by greenfield (as opposed to 
acquisition or joint venture). 
However, the likelihood of facing malfunctioning markets varies with the 
characteristics of the resources sought. A key distinction in the literature is between tangible 
assets (such as real estate) and intangible assets (such as brands). The transaction cost 
literature has analyzed entry strategies with respect to the assets, especially knowledge-based 
assets, that an investor would transfer to the new subsidiary (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; 
Hennart and Park 1993). A contract would be preferred if the resource contributions of at 
least one partner can be sold in a reasonably efficient market (Buckley and Casson, 1998). 
Three arguments have been put forward to suggest that certain types of resources are less 
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suitable to market exchange. While this literature has typically focused on resources to be 
transferred, we extend this line of thought by suggesting that the logic of the argument 
equally applies to resources sought.  
First, information asymmetries are a classic source of market failure. The market for 
information is prone to failure because buyers cannot assess the quality of the information 
prior to the exchange. However, once the information is known to both parties, buyers no 
longer have the incentive to reveal their true valuation of the information (Arrow, 1971; 
Akerlof, 1970). The prevalence of information asymmetries between buyers and sellers thus 
has long been a core motivation for the internalisation of transactions within firms (Buckley 
and Casson, 1976; Casson, 1997) and for the choice of a JV (Buckley and Casson, 1998; 
Brouthers and Hennart, 2007) or an acquisition (Hennart and Park, 1993) as a mode of entry.  
Second, asset specificity is at the core of Williamson’s (1985) transaction cost based 
explanation of organization forms, which has been applied to entry modes extensively 
following Anderson and Gatgnon (1986). Essentially, the more that business partners invest 
in resources specific to a transaction, the more they create interdependencies that expose 
them to potential opportunistic behaviour (Brouthers and Hennart, 2007; Brouthers et al., 
2003). This threat may inhibit transactions or encourage firms to internalise operations. Asset 
specificity arises in FDI in particular from partner-specific learning processes.  
Third, tacitness of knowledge inhibits its transfer unless instructor and receiver 
interact directly in a form of learning by doing, but this can make the transfer of knowledge 
very costly (Teece, 1977). Such learning by interpersonal interaction is difficult to organize 
via markets, and may be encouraged more effectively within organizations (Kogut and 
Zander, 1993). In consequence, interactions that involve the exchange of tacit knowledge 
may be internalised, again favoring acquisition or JV over greenfield entry.  
 All three lines of argument are more relevant for intangible assets than for tangible 
assets (Bruton, Dess, and Janney, 2007). Asset specificity can in principle occur when 
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resources are either intangible or tangible while information asymmetries and costs of tacit 
knowledge are challenges that arise from knowledge-components of resources, which are 
likely to be higher for intangible assets. Entrants may thus prefer to acquire another firm with 
the pertinent resources, but where such acquisitions are not feasible—for instance in contexts 
with weak institutions—they are more likely to opt for JV. Hence:   
H2b: The effect of H2a is stronger when requiring intangible assets compared to tangible 
assets. 
 Note that our hypotheses suggest that institutions discriminate primarily between JV 
and acquisition/greenfield, while resource needs primarily discriminate between greenfield 
and JV/acquisition. We thus go beyond much of the literature that, even when empirically 
testing three modes (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Chang and Rosenzweig, 2001; Elango and 
Sambharya, 2004), has not provided theoretical arguments for effects separating all three 
modes. However, how do the institutional and resource effects interact with each other? 
 
INSTITUTIONS + RESOURCES 
To understand how the two dimensions of institutions and resources interact, consider 
two extreme cases (Figure 1). If institutions are very weak and thus fail to ensure even 
modest efficiency of markets, foreign entrants would not be able to rely on markets to access 
local resources (cells 1-3). Under such conditions, acquisition may be prohibitively costly 
because of financial markets inefficiency. Moreover, in this situation it is likely that the 
resources of the acquired firm could not be properly valued and their integration would be 
challenging. Hence, foreign entrants in need of local resources would prefer creation of a new 
entity in partnership with a local firm, with both partners contribution selected resources and 
sharing control. This would apply to both tangible and intangible resources (cells 2 and 3).  
* * * Figure 1 about here * * * 
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In the opposite extreme case, where strong institutions make markets highly efficient, 
foreign entrants would probably be able to use contracts to arrange most transactions (cells 4-
6). Thus, greenfield entry becomes highly feasible. In this situation, acquiring resources in 
the form of tangible assets would not posit substantial challenges (cell 5). However, the three 
sources of market failure outlined above would still affect transactions in intangible 
resources. For example, transactions in goods or services with a high content of knowledge 
would be potentially subject to information asymmetries (Arrow, 1971; Buckley and Casson, 
1998), asset specificity (Williamson, 1985), or costly transfer of tacit knowledge (Teece, 
1977; Kogut and Zander, 1993). However, under strong institutions, the market for corporate 
control is relatively efficient and enables firms to engage in acquisition (cell 6).  
 Hence, we expect that under strong institutions, acquisitions would be more likely to 
be used when foreign entrants seek intangible resources held by local firms (cell 6), while 
greenfield operations are appropriate when relatively fewer local resources are required (cell 
4), or when resources are tangible and can be acquired or accessed using market transactions 
(cell 5). Specifically:  
H3a: Under conditions of strong institutions, the greater the need of foreign entrants for 
intangible resources, the more likely they are to use acquisition or joint venture rather than 
greenfield.  
H3b: Under conditions of strong institutions, the need for local tangible resources will not 
influence the choice of entry mode. 
Overall, in the empirical analysis, we expect a significant moderating effect of 
intangible resource needs on the institutional effect that is opposite to the direct effect, while 
the corresponding moderating effect of tangible resources may not be significant. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Four Emerging Economies 
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To test our hypotheses we require a cross-country sample that shows variation on the 
focal independent variable, yet, limited variation on other dimensions. We have thus selected 
four emerging economies with considerable variation in their institutional environment: 
Egypt, India, South Africa, and Vietnam (Table 1). However, they all show similarities with 
respect to other features that may influence FDI. For example, each is an important economy 
in its region, and each has pursued significant economic reforms since the 1990s. As a result 
of reforms, each experienced a surge of inward FDI during the 1990s. Annual FDI inflows 
peaked at $3 billion in Egypt (1999), $3.4 billion in India (2001), $6.7 billion in South Africa 
(2001), and $2.6 billion in Vietnam (1997) (United Nations, 2005). FDI inflows have 
remained relatively strong since then. 
* * * Table 1 about here * * * 
Variations in the local institutional environments include, for example, a fairly 
developed financial infrastructure in South Africa. Moreover, the institutional environment 
has been evolving differently in the four countries—improving particularly markedly in 
Vietnam (Meyer and Nguyen, 2005). The cross-country diversity implies that data pooled 
from these four economies provide significant variations in terms of institutions that may 
affect MNE entry strategies.  
Methods of Empirical Analysis 
The collection of the data for this article has been an ambitious, multicountry 
endeavor with project team members based in Western Europe as well as in each of the four 
emerging economies. Joint meetings were held in these four countries to prepare the study 
and to discuss key findings with the local business community. We collected our data in the 
four countries by combining questionnaire data with archival data. Our survey instrument 
provides data about the local subsidiaries, the parent MNEs, and managers’ perceptions of the 
local environment. In addition, we conducted twelve highly informative field-based case 
studies, three in each country, that helped us design this study (Estrin and Meyer, 2004). 
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Questionnaire. Our survey targeted CEOs of local MNE subsidiaries—both local 
executives and expatriates—as they are the most appropriate informants on the crucial 
aspects of the local context and the local operations. The questionnaire was developed by the 
authors in cooperation with the field research team leaders in each of the four countries, 
including a pilot on about 35 firms during 2001. The questionnaire was revised based on the 
feedback provided in the pilot stage and the insights generated by the case studies.  
Base population. The base population for our survey was defined as all FDI projects 
newly registered in the four countries between 1990 and 2000 that had a minimum 
employment of 10 persons and minimum of 10% equity stake by the foreign investor. For the 
current analysis, we only use the subset of post-1994 entries to reduce biases that may affect 
survey data referring to events too distant in the past. The stipulations concerning size and 
equity stake of the foreign investor ensured that sampled firms were substantive and 
operational businesses. The base population was constructed from locally available databases. 
In India and Vietnam, comprehensive databases were obtained from FDI regulatory 
authorities. In Egypt and South Africa, the base population had to be constructed from scratch 
using commercial databases supplemented with research by the country research teams.  
Data collection. The questionnaire was administered between 2001 and 2002.1 MNE 
subsidiaries were selected using stratified random sampling. The stratification was used to 
ensure that the inter-industry distribution of firms in the sample closely resembled that of the 
population at the 2-digit level. Once a firm was selected, teams that were specially trained for 
the administration of the questionnaire interviewed a top-level manager, usually the CEO. A 
total of 613 responses were received—response rates were 10% in Egypt, 11% in India, 23% 
in Vietnam, and 31% in South Africa. If less than 150 firms responded in any country, the 
                                                 
1
 In Vietnam, respondents received the questionnaire with both English and Vietnamese versions—in 
the case of Chinese/Taiwanese parent firms, they also received a Chinese version. The translations to 
Vietnamese and Chinese were done with the established back-translation procedures. While the 
Chinese version turned out to be an important instrument to establish contact and trust with the firms, 
almost all preferred to complete the Vietnamese or English versions. In the other three countries, 
English is established as the major language of business and we abstained from translation. 
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sample size was made up by replacement using randomly selected firms in each 2-digit 
industry. However, we dropped observations referring to entries before 1994 or with missing 
values, so our regression model uses 336 responses.  
We investigated whether the pattern of missing values might lead to bias in the 
estimation. We analysed the characteristics of enterprises by missing values in terms of 
country, sector, size and entry mode, testing whether the observations had to be dropped 
because missing values were systematically different from those retained in the sample. 
Similar tests were conducted to compare the questionnaire returns with the base population. 
Overall, we found little evidence of significant sample selection bias.2 
Main Variables and Models  
Our dependent variable is a categorical one, taking the value of 1 for greenfield, 2 for 
acquisition, and 3 for JV. The classification is based on the self-classification by respondents in 
the questionnaires, and has been triangulated by other questions in the survey.  
We use a multinomial logit (M-Logit) regression model that estimates the effect of the 
independent variables on the probability (differential odds) that one of the alternatives is 
chosen. Independent variables combine respondents’ assessment on Likert-type scales and 
objective measures like data on the parent firm as well as archival data (notably, on institutions) 
to avert common method bias. The explanatory variables are as follows—the survey instrument 
is available upon request. 
 Institutions. Based on archival data, we proxy the strength of market-supporting 
institutions by five items of the economic freedom index developed by the Heritage 
Foundation (Kane et al., 2007). This index provides information about a broad notion of 
institutions, focusing on the freedom of individuals and firms in a country to pursue their 
business activities. It contains data about 50 independent variables divided into 10 categories. 
                                                 
2
 We employed the two step Heckman procedure. In the first stage a probit model was estimated with 
the dummy dependent variable taking the value 1 if an observation is included in the sample and zero 
otherwise. This regression had a poor fit and the coefficients of the Inverse Mills Ratio in the second 
stage regressions were not significant. 
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This index has been used extensively, usually in its aggregate form, and has been found to be 
related positively to FDI inflows (Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles, 2003), economic growth 
(Easton, 1997; Berggren and Jordahl, 2005), and social welfare (Stroup, 2007).  
 Our theoretical considerations suggest that our concept of institutions focuses on 
institutions that support market efficiency. Therefore, we have selected five categories that 
most closely reflect the efficiency of markets: (1) business freedom, (2) trade freedom, (3) 
property rights, (4) investment freedom, and (5) financial freedom.3 This index incorporates 
the World Bank’s (2006) Doing Business indices that are used in similar research. We used 
the economic freedom data published in 2007, which report each category on a scale of zero 
to 100, but include data since the original creation of the index.4 This proxy has an essential 
advantage over other measures used in the literature as it is available as time series, which 
allow us to assign each observation the value pertaining to the year of entry.5  
Resource needs. We constructed two indices to measure the need of investors for 
tangible assets and intangible assets. The survey instrument asked the MNE subsidiaries to 
respond to two related questions out of a list of 17 items (see appendix), which was generated 
from our case research and refined in the pilot study. The first asked them to identify the three 
types of resources that were most important to the success of their business ventures. The second 
question asked the respondents to provide information about the extent to which these resources 
were contributed by the parent MNE, the local subsidiary (if any), overseas markets, and the 
local market (in percentage terms). We classified each resource as tangible or intangible, and 
defined the share of resources sourced from the host country as the sum of the shares sourced 
                                                 
3
 The items not included are fiscal freedom (a measure of taxation rates), freedom from government 
(share of government in GDP), monetary freedom (inflation and price controls), freedom from 
corruption and labour freedom.  These do not directly support the efficiency of markets and therefore 
not a suitable measure of our theoretical construct.  
4
 However, these data are incomplete for the early 1990s, such that we truncated the data to include 
only entrants from 1994 onwards. Moreover, we interpolated the economic freedom index for some 
missing years as it used to be published only every second year. 
5
 Other studies use for instance the World Competitiveness indices (Gaur and Lu, 2007; Yiu and 
Makino, 2002), which however are not available for longer periods using a consistent definition. 
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from the local partner and the host country market. Given this information, we defined the 
tangible index and intangible index, which reflect the relative contribution of local resources to 
the overall package of resources that the firm considers essential for its competitiveness, giving 
more weight to the resources ranked as more important.  
Specifically, let the percentage of a resource i sourced from the host country be xi. Each 
resource is assigned a weight corresponding with its ranking by the respondent, which may be 1, 
2, 3, or 0 (not ranked). Let wi be the weight associated with each xi, so that w1 = 3, w2 = 2, w3=1, 
and w0 = 0. For both types of resources, the index was calculated using the formula  
∑i wi xi / ∑i wi. 
Control Variables 
We need to control for variation in the data arising from three sources: the MNE, the 
country of origin, and the host economy. In addition, we include a time trend.  
MNE parent. Prior research has shown that resources contributed by the foreign 
partner are a major cause of internalization. Thus, foreign investors transferring assets that 
are potentially subject to market failure would be more likely to establish greenfield or 
acquisition rather than JV, which is well established in the literature (Gatignon and Anderson, 
1988; Kogut and Zander, 1993; Brouthers and Hennart, 2007). Thus, we control for R&D-
based capabilities (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Hennart and Park, 1993; Brouthers and Brouthers, 
2000), which we proxy by R&D intensity, measured by R&D expenditures as a percentage of 
sales on a scale from 1 (0-0.5%) to 7 (over 15%). Moreover, firms focusing on specific 
product lines, where they possess unique knowledge of processes and practices, may prefer 
greenfield entry, while diversified firms may prefer acquisition or JV (Hennart and Larimo, 
1998; Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000). Thus, we include a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 if the parent is a conglomerate MNE, and 0 if it is focused or related diversified.  
MNEs establishing subsidiaries that are large relative to their existing operations may 
not possess all the required resources, and thus may opt for a JV or acquisition to access 
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complementary resources (Hennart and Park, 1993; Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000). 
Therefore, we control for this effect using relative size, which is based on a 6-point scale 
reported in the questionnaire, where 1 stands for 0 to 0.1% and 6 stands for over 20% of the 
MNE’s global turnover. Moreover, the experience of foreign entrants influences international 
strategies (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; Luo and Peng, 1999), for which we control with 
two dummy variables. They capture respectively prior commercial experience in the same 
host country (experience country) or other emerging economies (experience EM).  
Local context. We control for other aspects of the local context that in addition to 
institutions affect entry strategies in multiple ways. First, we include GDP of the host economy 
as a measure of market size. Second, we control for unobserved characteristics of the local 
industries, using five industry dummies. Third, we control for other time varying effects, such as 
a general improvement of the business climate, by including a time trend from 1 for 1994 to 7 
for 2000. This allows us to separate the institutional effects from other environmental changes. 
Two measures control for characteristics of potential local target firms that may 
influence the available options for entry (Hitt et al., 2004). Local firm quality is a 3-item 
measure of respondents perceptions about the quality of the resources of local competitors at the 
time of entry, each based on a 5-point Likert scale (Crombach’s alpha 0.79). Local firm quantity 
is based on a five-point scale, where responds reported how many competitors there were in the 
market before the subsidiary started operations, ranging from 1 (none) to 5 (more than 10).  
Country of origin. The national origin of investors may impact the choice of entry 
mode (e.g. Hennart and Larimo, 1998). Therefore, we include GDP per capita of the 
investor’s home country and we control for cultural differences between home countries, 
using a cluster approach suggested by Ronen and Shenkar (1985). Thus, eight dummies are 
introduced based on nine clusters of countries of origin.6  
                                                 
6
 Because none of the firms in the sample originated in Latin America, we used only seven of Ronen 
and Shenkar’s (1985) eight clusters. In addition, we combined Japan (an independent) with Korea (not 
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Of the sampled FDI operations, 41.1% were established by greenfield, 11.7% by 
acquisition, and 47.1 % by JV. Table 2 shows that no substantive correlations affect the other 
independent variables.  
*** Table 2 about here *** 
 
RESULTS  
 The results of the multinomial regression model are shown in Table 3. We report the 
marginal effects of the probability that any of the three alternatives being chosen over the 
other two. Two equations are presented: Model 1 incorporates the direct effects of both 
institutions and resource and Model 2 introduces the moderating effects. In other words, 
Model 1 is nested in Model 2. We gain confidence in our regression specification from the 
fact that the model statistics reported in the table are satisfactory. Model 2 provides a better 
fit with substantially higher Wald and R2 statistics, indicating that the moderating effects are 
significant. In fact, on the basis of F tests we cannot accept the restriction that the moderating 
influences are insignificant, which implies that Model 2 is statistically the preferred 
specification. This indicates that the model with interaction effects should be used primarily 
to assess the hypotheses. The models also predict well—Model 2 generates 61.7% correct 
predictions, compared to a baseline random prediction of 40.6% (an increase of 52.1%). 
* * * Table 3 about here * * * 
 We also report results with and without a time trend in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. 
The time trend is not significantly related to any of the core variables (Table 2), suggesting 
the institutional variation in the dataset arises primarily due to cross-country variation rather 
than common trends across countries and time. One might, however, speculate that time trend 
and institutions are related. Thus, a conservative interpretation of the results would suggest 
                                                                                                                                                        
covered), and we added a cluster for other countries not covered by Ronen and Shenkar (1985), all of 
which are emerging economies. 
K. E. Meyer, S. Estrin, S. Bhaumik, and M. W. Peng (2008) 
Institutions, resources, and entry strategies in emerging economies (SMJ, forthcoming) 
 21 
using whichever model that shows the weaker support for hypotheses. 
*** Table 4 about here *** 
 The results are largely consistent with our hypotheses. In Hypothesis 1, we 
proposed that stronger institutions would discourage JVs and facilitate greenfield and 
acquisition entry. Using Model 2, strong support emerges for the hypothesis on all three 
coefficients: significantly positive on greenfield and acquisition, and significantly negative on 
JV. The time trend slightly weakens the size of the coefficients on institutions (compare 
Table 3 and 4), suggesting that the time trend may be capturing a part of the strengthening of 
institutions experienced in these countries. In Models 1 (Table 3) and 3 (Table 4), with only 
direct effects, the hypothesis is also supported with respect to acquisitions, while the 
coefficients on greenfield and JV are correctly signed. We note that the institutional effect on 
acquisitions is the only effect that has a 1%-level effect on acquisitions in Model 2, 
suggesting that institutions are particularly important to facilitate acquisition entry.  
 The results are more mixed with respect to Hypotheses 2. Commencing with 
Hypothesis 2a, the results are different using the models with and without interaction effects. 
Without interaction effects, the regression results appear to provide strong support for 
Hypothesis 2a (Model 1 in Table 3 and Model 3 in Table 4), with negative effects on 
greenfield and positive effects on JV and acquisition. In the preferred model with interaction 
effects, however, the size of the coefficients are similar but the standard deviations are higher 
so the estimates are not significant (Models 2 and 4). With respect to Hypothesis 2b, we find 
that the differences in the size coefficients are as expected, but very small. Thus, our findings 
are consistent with the proposed signs of the hypothesis but are not significant.  
With respect to Hypothesis 3a, we find that, as predicted, the moderating effect is 
positive on greenfield and negative on JV (Model 2 in Table 3 and Model 4 in Table 4), and 
thus opposite to the direct effect of institutions. Hence, firms seeking intangible resources 
would use JV even when the institutional framework becomes stronger. Moreover, the 
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moderating effect on tangible resources is not significant, as predicted in Hypothesis 3b. 
Hence, firms seeking local tangible resources, like those not seeking any local resources, 
become less likely to enter by JV when institutions become stronger.  
 We conclude that, as predicted, institutional and resource effects crucially interact. 
Strengthening the institutional environment directly encourages acquisition and greenfield 
entry at the expense of JV entry. However, even when institutions are better developed, if 
foreign entrants need intangible local resources, they may still use JVs as an entry mode 
because they are exposed to product-related inefficiencies in markets.  
 The pattern of control variables also largely corresponds to our expectations. 
Conglomerate MNEs entering an emerging economy are more likely to choose JV entry, 
consistent with earlier studies (Hennart and Larimo, 1988; Brouther and Brouthers, 2000). Of 
particular interest may be the country-of-origin effects, which account for a large share of 
explanatory power of the model, according to Wald tests. Germanic, Japanese/Korean, and 
Arab MNEs are more likely to opt for JVs and against greenfield than US and UK MNEs. In 
addition, investors originating from high income countries are more likely to choose JV as 
entry mode. Entrants from Near East (Greece, Turkey, and Israel in Ronan and Shenkar’s 
[1985] definition) and from other emerging economies are less likely to enter by acquisition. 
These patterns are interesting because we did not find significant effects when we used the 
more popular index of cultural distance developed by Kogut and Singh (1988) (regressions 
not reported). Thus, the Ronan and Shenkar (1985) clusters may be more suitable than the 
Kogut and Singh index to control for country of origin variations in entry mode equations.   
 
DISCUSSION  
Contributions 
 In response to recent calls for more integration between institution-based and 
resource-based perspectives in emerging economies (Peng, 2001; Meyer and Peng, 2005; 
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Wright et al., 2005; Yamakawa et al., 2008), this article makes three theoretical, empirical, 
and methodological contributions. Theoretically, we argue that (1) the level of development 
of an emerging economy’s market-supporting institutions directly influences MNEs’ entry 
strategies by facilitating entry by greenfield and acquisition, and that (2) institution-based 
considerations complement resource-based considerations when crafting entry strategies. 
Therefore, we enrich an institution-based view of business strategy (Oliver, 1997; Peng, 
2003, 2009; Gelbuda et al., 2008; Peng et al., 2008) by providing a fine-grained analysis of 
the relationship between institutional frameworks and entry strategies. 
Empirically, through a rigorous, four-country survey design combined with archival 
data, we find that the stronger the institutional framework, the more likely investors would 
choose acquisitions and greenfield. The literature has so far investigated the role of 
institutions at aggregate levels (Meyer, 2001; Wan and Hoskisson, 2003; Dikova and van 
Witteloostuijn, 2007) or focusing on indirect effects such as uncertainty due to instable 
institutions (Delios and Henisz, 2000; Brouthers and Brouthers, 2003). We have argued that it 
is their effect on the effectiveness of markets—or their reduction of institutional voids 
(Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Kedia et al., 2006)—that provides the incentives to internalize 
resource acquisitions and this influences entry choices.  
Moreover, we tease out how institution-based and resource-based variables 
complement and interact to predict entry strategies. We have argued that these two decisions 
are interdependent because both resource and institutional variables affect the suitability of 
markets as channel to access local resources (Figure 1). Hence, studies on entry modes 
focusing on product and firm characteristics (Hennart and Park, 1993; Luo, 2002) may 
generate results that cannot be generalised beyond the specific host context in which the 
study has been conducted (Meyer, 2006, 2007).  
Of particular interest may be our findings with respect to acquisitions. The positive 
effect of institutional development on acquisition entry is significant even without controlling 
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for interaction effect, and moreover it stands out as the only highly significant effect 
explaining acquisition entry. Thus, more efficient markets facilitate acquisition entry. In part 
this may be due to the development of financial markets. However, other markets (such as 
product, labor, and technology markets) may be also important for effective acquisitions 
because they provide critical information that in turn is essential to value the acquisition 
target (Lee, Peng, and Lee, 2008). Moreover, where institutions are weak, firms may rely to a 
large extent on network- and relationship-based interaction (Peng and Heath, 1996), yet such 
network and relationship resources are hard to value as well. Furthermore, acquisitions are 
strongly negatively associated with certain countries of origin, namely the Near East and 
emerging economies. This may be because MNEs from these countries have fewer financial 
resources to draw upon, or they lack experience in this mode due to the relatively inactive 
market for corporate control in their own home countries (Tsang and Yip, 2007).   
Finally, we also make two small methodological contributions. First, we introduce 
time varying proxies of institutions—economic freedom. In the spirit of Peng (2003), this 
approach allows empirical studies to analyze the impact of institutions (or other country-level 
variables) to exploit variation over time, where cross-country variation closely correlates with 
other country-level variables. Second, we find that the Ronen and Shenkar (1985) cultural 
clusters provide a more powerful means to control for country-of-origin effects than the 
popular Kogut and Singh (1998) index. Therefore, studies controlling for country effects may 
need to consider the Ronen and Shenkar clusters, especially when dealing with emerging 
economies. Moreover, more research is warranted to explore the nature and causes of the 
country-of-origin variation that emerges so powerfully in our results (Tsang and Yip, 2007).  
Limitations and Future Research Directions  
 First, a pertinent question for empirical studies is always whether the empirical 
relationships identified in the study could be explained by different mechanisms than those 
proposed by the authors. In our case, we may be concerned about possible correlations of our 
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institutional variable based on the economic freedom index with other country-specific 
effects. To minimize this possibility, we use a time-varying measure and control for a time 
trend, GDP, and source country characteristics, the most likely additional influences. Future 
researchers may wish to work with larger sets of countries, so as to increase the cross-country 
variance in the set of institutional independent variables. 
  A second concern is the quality of proxies. We collected local data to get as close as 
possible to the context (the focus of our research), and thus distinguish ourselves from earlier 
study designs driven by MNE headquarters perspectives. At the same time, we are able to 
represent a wide cross-section of host and home countries. This compares very favourably 
with numerous studies using single-country data. Moreover, we combine two different types 
of data—namely, archival and survey data—to avert common method biases. However, this 
approach implies that our controls for the parent firms may not be as good as in earlier 
research. Future research may aim to improve this by collecting data at two sites in each 
firm—both headquarters and local subsidiary. 
 Third, we only investigate equity-based foreign entry modes (Tse et al., 1997) and do 
not differentiate levels of subsidiary ownership (Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004). An advanced 
modelling approach may try to integrate non-equity modes (Wang and Nicholas, 2007; 
Welsh, Benito, and Petersen, 2007) in the analysis to test for possible interdependencies of 
this decision with the choice between JV, acquisition and greenfield, and/or to differentiate 
equity modes by their level of ownership.  
 Finally, our study leaves a number of questions awaiting future research. Addressing 
these questions will not only make more progress on research focusing on emerging 
economies, but will also propel the global research agenda. These questions are: 
• What are the specific aspects of institutions that explain variations of business strategies 
both over time and between countries?  
• What exactly are the resources that foreign entrants acquire from local partners, and in 
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what ways are transactions in these resources inhibited by the specific market failures of 
emerging economies to such an extent that they would become internalized?  
• How does the supply side of local resources, embedded in local firms or otherwise, 
constrain entry strategies? In particular, what aspects of local firms and industry would 
significantly inhibit acquisition strategies?  
 
CONCLUSION 
  What determines market entry strategies into emerging economies? Our answer is 
(1) that institutions directly influence such entry strategies, and (2) that this effect is 
moderated by the entrant’s need for different types of local resources. Our theoretical 
framework shows that this interaction arises from the simultaneous impacts of resource and 
institutional characteristics on the efficiency of markets for a given transaction, in particular 
foreign entrants’ interest in local resources—both tangible and intangible. In conclusion, if 
this article could only contain one message, we would like it to be a sense of not only the 
strong explanatory and predictive power of institutions, but also the significant increase of 
our understanding when the institution-based view is integrated with the resource-based 
view.  
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Figure 1. Resources, Institutions, and Market Failure 
(NOTE to typesetter: Please let this figure occupy TWO columns of one page—it will 
lose its visual impact if you let it only occupy the space of one column. Thx!) 
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Table 1. Four Emerging Economies1 
Macro-context Egypt India South 
Africa 
Vietnam 
GDP per capita 
(US$)  
1490 460 3020 390 
GDP  
(current US$ billion)  
102.21 461.35 132.88 31.17 
GDP growth  
(annual %) 
5.40 3.99 4.15 6.79 
Foreign direct investment, net inflows  
(current US$ billion) 
1.24 3.58 0.97 1.30 
 
Institutions  
    
Business Freedom 30 30 70 10 
Trade Freedom 50 40 56 46 
Investment Freedom 50 30 70 30 
Financial Freedom 30 30 50 30 
Property Rights 50 50 50 10 
Economic Freedom, 5-item index2 42.0 35.9 59.2 25.2 
Economic Freedom,10-item index 51.3 45.7 61.3 39.4 
Sources: World Development Indicators, Heritage Foundation, authors’ survey.  
1 All data refer to the year 2000. Our survey was piloted in 2000 and administered in 2001-02. 
2
 In our empirical analysis we use the 5-item index as the more appropriate measure of our theoretical construct; 
the Heritage Foundation publicizes the broader 10 item index. 
H2a 
H2b 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
  Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 13 
1 Economic freedom 41.67 13.67             
2 Intangible assets 43.48 34.75 0.04            
3 Tangible assets 20.08 34.97 0.21 0.20           
4 Time trend 6.59 2.56 0.09 0.06 -0.01          
5 Local firm quality 2.84 1.03 0.12 0.08 0.07 0.04         
6 Local firm quantity 3.25 1.38 0.16 0.16 0.07 0.03 0.21        
7 Experience country # 0.45 0.50 0.15 0.02 0.03 0.09 -0.02 0.10       
8 Experience EM # 0.56 0.50 0.35 0.10 -0.03 -0.06 0.08 0.10 0.10      
9 Relative Size 3.17 1.80 -0.10 -0.08 0.07 0.00 -0.03 0.01 -0.09 -0.26     
10 R&D 3.11 2.09 0.16 -0.07 -0.07 -0.02 0.10 0.04 0.08 0.11 0.01    
11 Conglomerate # 0.16 0.36 -0.02 -0.01 0.06 -0.03 0.05 -0.03 0.05 -0.04 -0.14 -0.10   
12 GDP host (million) 142.7 125.2 0.07 0.06 -0.04 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.15 -0.11 0.07 -0.14  
13 GDP pc source  221691 104.56 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.11 -0.06 -0.03 0.11 0.16 -0.24 0.11 -0.08 0.25 
Notes: N = 420; correlations of over 0.10* are significant at 5% level.
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Table 3. Multinomial Regression (Marginal Effects)  
 _____________Model 1___________ ____________Model 2___________ 
 Greenfield Acquisition  JV         Greenfield Acquisition JV 
Main Regressors 
      
Institutions (x102) 0.33 
(0.25) 
0.13*** 
(0.04) 
-0.45* 
(0.25) 
0.84** 
(041) 
0.12*** 
(0.04) 
-0.95** 
(0.41) 
Intangible Assets 
(x102)  
-0.25 *** 
(0.09) 
0.02 ** 
(0.01) 
0.23 *** 
(0.08) 
0.30 
(0.28) 
0.00 
(0.03) 
-0.30 
(0.28) 
Tangible Assets (x102) -0.24 *** 
(0.08) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.24 *** 
(0.09) 
-0.46 
(0.29) 
0.05 
(0.03) 
0.42 
(0.29) 
Institutions x Intangible 
(x104) 
--- --- --- -1.30** 
 (0.70) 
0.00  
(0.00) 
1.28**  
(0.70) 
Institutions x Tangible 
(x104) 
--- --- --- 0.48  
(0.70) 
0.01 
(0.10) 
-0.40  
(0.70) 
Controls       
Local firm quality 
(x102) 
-1.71 
(2.93) 
0.11 
(0.24) 
1.59 
(2.93) 
2.10 
(2.96) 
0.06 
(0.18) 
2.04 
(2.96) 
Local firm quantity 
(x102) 
-0.39 
(2.19) 
0.22 
(0.18) 
0.17 
(2.19) 
-0.62 
(2.19) 
0.18 
(0.15) 
0.44 
(2.19) 
Experience country # -0.01 
(0.06) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
-0.01 
(0.06) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.06) 
Experience EM # -0.07 
(0.06) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.06 
(0.06) 
-0.07 
(0.06) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.07 
(0.06) 
Relative Size 0.02 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.13) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
R&D (x102) 0.96 
(1.41) 
0.01 
(0.11) 
-0.96 
(1.40) 
1.13 
(1.42) 
-0.00 
(0.09) 
-1.13 
(1.42) 
Conglomerate # -0.19*** 
(0.07) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
0.18** 
(0.07) 
-0.19*** 
(0.07) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
0.19** 
(0.07) 
GDP host (x102) -0.023 
(0.003) 
0.001  
(0.003) 
0.024 
(0.025) 
-0.026 
(0.024) 
0.001  
(0.002) 
0.024 
(0.024) 
GDP pc source (x102) -0.015 
(0.039) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
0.011 
(0.039) 
-0.013 
(0.039) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.011 
(0.039) 
Clust Near-eastern # -0.15  
(0.18) 
-0.02 **  
(0.01) 
0.16  
(0.18) 
-0.15  
(0.19) 
-0.01**  
(0.01) 
0.16  
(0.19) 
Clust Nordic #  -0.11  
(0.11) 
-0.01  
(0.00) 
0.12   
(0.11) 
-0.13  
(0.10) 
-0.00  
(0.00) 
0.14   
(0.10) 
Clust Germanic # -0.21**  
(0.09) 
-0.00  
(0.01) 
0.20 **  
(0.09) 
-0.22**  
(0.09) 
-0.00  
(0.01) 
0.21**  
(0.09) 
Clust Latin-Europe # -0.05  
(0.10) 
-0.00  
(0.01) 
0.05   
(0.10) 
-0.05  
(0.10) 
-0.00  
(0.00) 
0.05   
(0.10) 
Clust Far Eastern # -0.03  
(0.11) 
-0.01  
(0.01) 
0.04 
(0.11) 
-0.02  
(0.11) 
-0.01  
(0.01) 
0.02    
(0.11) 
Clust Japan/Korea # -0.20**  
(0.09) 
0.01  
(0.03) 
0.19** 
(0.09) 
-0.20**  
(0.09) 
0.01  
(0.02) 
0.19**  
(0.09) 
Clust Arab # -0.29 *** 
(0.09) 
-0.02  
(0.04) 
0.28 *** 
(0.10) 
-0.30*** 
(0.09) 
-0.01  
(0.02) 
0.28*** 
(0.10) 
Clust Other EMs # -0.29 ** 
(0.11) 
-0.02 **  
(0.01) 
0.31 *** 
(0.11) 
-0.32*** 
(0.10) 
-0.02**  
(0.01) 
0.33*** 
(0.10) 
5 industry dummies Yes** Yes Yes** Yes** Yes Yes** 
Log likelihood  -326.0   -322.3  
Wald chi-square  6281.1***   7223.2***  
Pseudo R-square  20.2%   21.1%  
Observations  421   421  
Notes to Table 3 and 4: Levels of significance: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%; standard errors in parentheses; # = 
dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.  
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Table 4. Multinomial Regression (Marginal Effects): Controlling for Time Trend  
 ____________Model 3____________ _____________Model 4___________ 
 Greenfield Acquisition JV Greenfield Acquisition JV 
Main Regressors 
      
Institutions (x102) 0.22 
(0.26) 
0.13*** 
(0.04) 
-0.34 
(0.26) 
0.74* 
(040) 
0.12*** 
(0.04) 
-0.86** 
(0.41) 
Intangible Assets 
(x102) 
-0.26*** 
(0.08) 
0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.25*** 
(0.08) 
0.29 
(0.28) 
0.00 
(0.03) 
-0.29 
(0.28) 
Tangible Assets (x102) -0.22*** 
(0.09) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.22** 
(0.09) 
-0.42 
(0.29) 
0.05 
(0.03) 
0.37 
(0.28) 
Institutions*Intangible  
(x104) 
--- --- --- -1.32** 
 (0.70) 
-0.00  
(0.00) 
1.29**  
(0.70) 
Institutions*Tangible 
(x104) 
--- --- --- 0.43  
(0.60) 
0.01 
(0.10) 
-0.35  
(0.60) 
Controls       
Time Trend 
 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
-0.00  
(0.00) 
-0.03**  
(0.01) 
0.03**  
(0.01) 
-0.00 
 (0.00) 
-0.03**  
(0.01) 
Local firm quality 
(x102) 
-2.11 
(2.93) 
0.13 
(0.24) 
1.98 
(2.93) 
2.51 
(2.97) 
0.07 
(0.17) 
2.45 
(2.97) 
Local firm quantity 
(x102) 
-0.22 
(2.20) 
0.22 
(0.18) 
0.01 
(2.20) 
-0.43 
(2.20) 
0.17 
(0.14) 
0.26 
(2.20) 
Experience country # -0.03 
(0.06) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.02 
(0.06) 
-0.02 
(0.06) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.02 
(0.06) 
Experience EM # -0.06 
(0.06) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.05 
(0.06) 
-0.06 
(0.06) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.06 
(0.06) 
Relative Size 0.02 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.14) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
R&D (x102) 1.13 
(1.43) 
0.00 
(0.12) 
-1.14 
(1.42) 
1.28 
(1.44) 
-0.00 
(0.09) 
-1.28 
(1.42) 
Conglomerate # -0.18** 
(0.07) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
0.18** 
(0.07) 
-0.18*** 
(0.07) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
0.18** 
(0.07) 
GDP host (x102) -0.029 
(0.024) 
0.001  
(0.003) 
0.028 
(0.024) 
-0.029 
(0.024) 
0.001  
(0.002) 
0.028 
(0.024) 
GDP pc source (x102) -0.040 
(0.040) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
0.037 
(0.041) 
-0.038 
(0.041) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.036 
(0.041) 
Clust Near-eastern # -0.16  
(0.17) 
-0.02**  
(0.01) 
0.17  
(0.17) 
-0.16  
(0.17) 
-0.01**  
(0.01) 
0.18  
(0.17) 
Clust Nordic #  -0.12  
(0.11) 
-0.01  
(0.00) 
0.12   
(0.11) 
-0.14  
(0.11) 
-0.00  
(0.00) 
0.14   
(0.10) 
Clust Germanic # -0.21**  
(0.09) 
0.00  
(0.01) 
0.21**  
(0.09) 
-0.22**  
(0.09) 
0.00  
(0.00) 
0.22**  
(0.09) 
Clust Latin-Europe # -0.08  
(0.10) 
0.00  
(0.01) 
0.08   
(0.10) 
-0.09  
(0.10) 
-0.00  
(0.00) 
0.09   
(0.10) 
Clust Far Eastern # -0.10  
(0.11) 
-0.01  
(0.01) 
0.10    
(0.11) 
-0.08  
(0.11) 
-0.01  
(0.01) 
0.09    
(0.11) 
Clust Japan/Korea # -0.23***  
(0.08) 
0.01  
(0.03) 
0.22**   
(0.09) 
-0.23**  
(0.09) 
0.01  
(0.02) 
0.22**   
(0.09) 
Clust Arab # -0.34*** 
(0.09) 
0.02  
(0.04) 
0.32*** 
(0.09) 
-0.34*** 
(0.09) 
0.01  
(0.02) 
0.32*** 
(0.09) 
Clust Other EMs # -0.32*** 
(0.09) 
-0.02**  
(0.01) 
0.34*** 
(0.09) 
-0.35*** 
(0.08) 
-0.02**  
(0.01) 
0.36*** 
(0.08) 
5 industry dummies Yes** Yes Yes** Yes** Yes Yes** 
Log likelihood  -322.8   -319.1  
Wald chi-square  5897.7***   6909.2***  
Pseudo R-square  20.8%   21.7%  
Observations  420   420  
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Appendix: Selected Items from the Questionnaire  
 
Resources for Successful Performance  
1.    Buildings and real estate  
2.    Brand Names   
3.    Business network relationships  
4.    Distribution network  
5.    Equity  
6.    Innovation capabilities  
7.    Licences  
8.    Loans  
9.    Machinery and equipment  
10.  Managerial capabilities  
11.  Marketing capabilities  
12.  Networks with authorities  
13.  Patents  
14.  Sales outlets  
15.  Technological know-how  
16.  Trade contacts  
Which of the following types of 
resources were most crucial for the 
successful performance of the affiliate 
during the first two years of operation. 
Please rank the three most important 
ones as 1, 2, 3.  
 
For example, if Equity, Loans and 
Patents were, in that order, the three 
most important resources, then put 1 
against Equity, 2 against Loans, and 
3 against Patents. 
 
17.  Other (Specify: ________________)  
 
Where did the affiliate obtain the three resources indicated above during the first two years of operation? Please 
provide approximate percentages:  
 
 Resource 1 Resource 2 Resource 3 
1. Local firm (JV-partner or acquired firm) % %   % 
2. Foreign parent firm % %   % 
3. Other local sources % %   % 
4. Other foreign sources  % %   % 
5. Other (specify: ______________________ ) % %   % 
 100% 100%   100% 
 
Note: As tangible resources were classified: buildings and real estate, equity, loans, machinery and equipment, 
patents, sales outlets, and licences. Intangible resources included brands, business network, distribution 
network, managerial capabilities, innovation capabilities, marketing capabilities, networks with 
authorities, technological know-how, and trade contacts. The “other" option received only a negligible 
number of entries. 
 
